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CAMPUS NOTES.
The students of the Preparatory School,
the College and Law School of Dickinson,
had a monstrous street parade, followed by
a bonfire on the campus, on the evening
of November 26th, to celebrate our football
victory over Lafayette, at Easton. The
street parade was headed by the Law
School band, which gained a reputation
for itself by producing the sweet strains of
" Hiawatha" with sufficient harmony for
recognition.
The first of a series of six informal dances
was held by the Comus Club, in Armory
Hall, Saturday evening, December 5tb.
The affair was highly successful.
CLASS NOTES.
Magrady, '06, entertained several friends
during tile week of Teachers' County Institute.
Park, '05, returned to his home, at Monroeton, on the 10th, on account of illness,
and will remain there until after the
Christmas holidays.

Kaufman, M. D., '05, went home on
December 8th, on account of sickness. He
will not return until next term.
Lanard, '04, spent December 11th, 12th
and 13th at Cornell University.
Prickett, '04, witnessed the Pennsylvania-Cornell game on Franklin field, Philadelphia, on Thanksgiving.
Fleitz, '04, and Hillyer, '04, took in the
Dickinson-Lafayette game, at Easton, on
Thanksgiving.
Laub, '06, and F. B. MacAlee, '06, took
the preliminary examination before the Supreme Court board of examiners at Harrisburg, on December 8th and 9th.
Marching to the time of a melodious tin
horn and a kettle drum, the students of
the Law School paraded T. J. E. Yocum
up and down the main streets of the town,
on the evening of December 1st, in celebration of his alleged wedding in Wilmington, Del., on Thanksgiving Day. The
crowd called in vain for "Mrs Youum,"
after which T. J. E. acquired the pronounced distinction of being the only student who ever delivered an oration off the

50

THE FORUM

cannon on "the square." His later feat
of climbing down a lamppost was equally
enjoyable, and "The Man from Piedmont"
was returned to his home with a full appreciation of the regards of his fellow students.
FRATERNITY NOTES.
An informal banquet was held by Delta
Chi fraternity, in Mrs. Monyer's parlors,
on the evening of November 27th. The
guests of honor were Professors Weakley
and Hutton.
Theta Lambda Phi installed a chapter
of their fraternity at Cornell University
recently. Thomas P. Lanard, '04, of
Holmes chapter, the high priest of the
fraternity, conducted the ceremonies.
ALUMNI NOTES.
Herman M. Sypherd, '00, and D. M.
Kline, '01, of Freeland, paid a short visit
in town on December 9th. They were on
their way to West Virginia.
Charles E. Daniel, '98, is building up a
lucrative practice in Scranton.
D. Edward Long, '00, is establishing
offices in Chambersburg.
Clarence F. Albertson, '03, who successfully passed the Supreme Court examinations in New Jersey recently, has formed
a partnership with G. Arthur Bolte, 100,
in Atlantic City.
J. D. Crary, ex-'03, is president of a
street railway company in Seattle, Washington.
P. M. Graul, '01, of Lehighton, witnessed the Lafayette-Dickinson game at
Easton, November 26th. A male heir recently added happiness to his home.
Paul A. A. Core,'03, cashier in theUnited
States revenue office at Pittsburg, visited
his friends at Carlisle, November 30th and
December 1st.
LeRoy B. C. Delaney, '03, of Pittsburg,
was in town on Thanksgiving Day. He
expects to settle shortly in New Mexico.

A. B. Mclntire, '02, is practicing law in
West Virginia.
James J. Logan, ex-'04, is a member of
the firm of Logan & Logan, attorneys-atlaw, 5 East Market street, York, Pa. Last
August he had his first homicide case, and
secured a verdict of "not guilty" for his
client.
H. T. Vastine, '03 ; Walter Bishop, '03;
G. S. Mowry, '03 ; Harvey A. Gross, '03;
Edison B. Williamson, '03; H. Robert
Mays, '02, and Samuel Kaufman, '03, took
the final examination before the Supreme
Court Board of Examiners, at Harrisburg,
December 8th and 9th, after which they all
visited their friends at Carlisle.
Chas. H. Drumheller, '03, of Harrisburg,
is confined to his home through'illness.
J. B. Ebbert, '03; H. A. Gross, '03, and
E. B. Williamson, '03, rep.ently took the
seven days' examination for admission to
the York County Bar.
W. W. Johnston, '01",
at present located
in Scranton, was in town callingon friends
on December 14. Mr. Johnston is one of
the most successful young men recently
graduated from the school. He has a lucrative law practice, and is engaged in
various business enterprises prominent in
the coal regions.

MOOT COURT.
HOLT vs. WRENN.
Assumpsit-Implied warrantyof qualityLatent defects - "Caveat emptor" defined.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Plaintiff was poisoned by beer which he
bought from the defendant, a tavernkeeper, who in turn had bought it from
the brewer. The poison which the beer
contained, owing to defective brewing,
could have been detected only by a skillful chemist. This action is brought on an
implied warranty that the beer was fit to
drink, and that defendant is liable for the
injury plaintiff sustained.
GILrLESPIE for the plaintiff.
In contracts for provisions it is always
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implied that they are wholesome. Osgood
v. Lewis, 2 Har. & G. (Md.) 495; Wright
v. Hart, 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 267; Hoe v.
Sanborn, 21 N. Y. 552; Jones v. Murray,
3 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 83; Moore v. MeKinley, 5 Cal. 471; Getty v. Rountree, 2
Chand. (Wis.) 28; Giroux v. Stedman,
145 Mass. 439; also note to Reynolds v.
Palmer, 21 Fed. Rep. 453.
Where food is sold by a dealer for domestic consumption there is an implied
warranty that it is good and wholesome.
Lukens v. Frenind, 27 Kan. 664.
Cooic for the defendant.
In the absence'of fraud there is no warranty of the quality, and the buyer takes
at his own risk. Am. & Eng. Ency. of
Law, Vol. 15, p. 1218.
Where a manufacturer puts out his
goods to a dealer or middleman who buys
to sell, in the absence of an agreement or
warranty by the seller, the buyer takes at
his own risk. Harrisou v. Sharkey, 34 Pa.
236; Huston v. Cook, 153 Pa. 43.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

It is frequently stated that a vendor impliedly warrants the merchantability of
goods to a purchaser who has no opportunity to examine them. The limit, if any,
to which this warranty extends, however,
is doubtful.
The difference between the civil and
common law in relation to implied warran ties upon the sales of personal property
was vast. Indeed, the two were in direct
opposition to each other. The civil law
approved the maxim caveat venditor,
while the common law adhered to the rule
(aveat emptor.
The latter principle was adopted by, and
is the one followed in, the United States.
Let the buyer beware. Beware of what ?
That, in the sales of personal property,
there are the implied warranties that the
thing sold exists and is capable of being
transferred; tha't the vendor has a good
and valid title thereto; that the seller wvill
deliver the exact 4uantity of the commodity sold, is undoubted. Hence, we find
that both the civil law and the common
law, (notwithstanding the difference suggested by the maxims) are in accord in respect to the existence, title, and quantity
of the thing sold. As to the implied warranties of quality, they differ, and, in the
absence of fraud, the general rule of the
common law is that there is no implied
warranty of the quality of the goods sold ;
the buyer is deemed to purchase at his own
risk. But however strict the common law

is it recognized the fact that where a vendee relies upon the skill and judgment of
the vendor to make for or deliver to him
articles fit for the use to which they are
to be put, the law will imply a warranty
upon the part of the vendor that he has
done his duty and has made or furnished
articles adapted to the purpose for which
they were ordered. Jones v. Just, 3 Q. B.
197; Randall v. Newson, 2 Q. B. D. 102.
Whether this wartanty extends to defects
not discoverable is doubtful. Our courts
have drawn a distinction between sales by
a dealer and sales by a manufacturer.
Thus they hold that the manufacturer
warrants against all defects, whether discoverable or not. Rodgers v. Stiles, 11
Ohio St. 48. While the dealeris liable only
for defects which are discoverable by examination. White v. Oakes, 88 Me. 367.
Whether the distinction is justifiable or
not is doubtful. The reason assigned for
the same is that the manufacturer had
greater opportunity to obviate and detect
these defects. While it may have some
bearing on the tort-liability of the dealer,
it certainly does not follow that he bas
impliedly promised less. There were certain sales, however, which imposed exceptional liability on the seller. Blackstone says that in contracts for provisions
it is always implied that they are wholesome, and that if they are not wholesome
the vendor is liable. 3 Black Coin. 165.
The English cases, however, support the
rule that at common law there is no implied warranty of quality, fitness or wholesomeness in the sale of provisions, even
when sold by the dealer for immediate domestic use. The only case we have been
able to find in the United States supporting this doctrine is Emerson v. Bigelow,
10 Mass. 197, in which Justice Sewall remarks that there is nothing to be inferred
in the sale of provisions which may not
be inferred to alike purpose inothercases.
But here, as in the case of a manufacturer
and dealer, our courts have drawn another
distinction as to the liability of a person
who sells to another for the purpose of resale, and the person who sells direct to the
consumer. In the former case it is held
that there is no implied warranty of
soundness or wholesomeness arising from
the sale of food provisions to a dealer or
middleman who buys on the market, not
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for consumption, but for sale to others.
Cannon v. Young, 19 Penna. 2.39. While
in the latter it is held that in all sales of
food provisions by a retail dealer for immediate domestic use there is an implied
warranty of fitness and wholesomeness for
consumlption. McNaughtonv. Joy, 1 V.
N. C. 470, and cases cited ill Vol. 15 (2d
Ed.) Am. & Eug. Enc. of Law, 1238. From
the above cited cases we deduce the principles that ordinarily, in sales of personal
property, the manufacturer and not the
dealer is liable for latent defects, but that
in the case of provisions it is the dealer or
middleman and not the producer who is
liable. (In England the Sale of Goods
Act, 1893, makes manufacturer and dealer
alike liable.)
We are, therefore, of the opinion that in
the sale of provisions for immediate consumption there is an implied warranty of
wholesomeness, and further, that the defendant, Wrenn, in the case at bar is liable
in assumpsit on his implied warranty.
WILLIS, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

Wrenn, a tavern keeper, bought beer
from a brewery, and sold some of it to
Holt, a customer. The beer had been
made poisonous in the process of brewing,
and Holt became sick in consequence of
drinking it. This is assumpsit for the
damages.
There was no express warranty by
Wrenn that the beer was free from poison.
The case does not find that there was an
implied contract (as distinguished from a
quasi-contract) that the beer was sound.
We cannot assume, therefore, that there
was.
Nor, would it have been proper to submit to the jury to say whether there was
such implied warranty. When A goes to
a grocer's and buys a slice of ham, the jury
would not, from that fact alone, be authorized to say that A understood, and
that the grocer knew that A understood,
that he, the grocer, was warranting, unconditionally, the freedom of the ham from
trichina3 or other noisome defects. Nor
would it, when A bought ice cream at a
saloon, or beer at a restaurant. The vendee might possibly assume that the vendor
was tacitly assuring him that the article
was not known by the former to have any
such defect, and that he had made reason-

able efforts to find out whether it had. It
would surprise the ordinary buyer orseller
to hear that the former wat impliedly
promising to be responsible for any serious defects, whether they were, with the
utmost diligence, discoverable by him
or not. An implied promise is an actual,
not a fictitious promise. A promise could
as safely be implied, in every case in which
any one sold to another, any article, with
knowledge that the buyer expected it to
have any given qualities.
It is not necessary to inquire whether
when beer, ham, ice cream, or anything
else is asked for by tile buyerand something
is tendered by the seller, in response, there
is a condition annexed to the tender and
acceptance, that the article is of the class
asked for. If it is not, the buyer would
not need to accept, and if he accepted in
ignorance of the discrepancy between the
thing asked and the thing tendered, he
could return the article, and escape paying
for it; or even having used it before discovering the discrepancy, if he obtained
no advantage from it, could escape paying
for it, or having paid for it, could recover
the money back.
It would revolutionize the law of sales to
hold that when the vendor knows that the
vendee is expecting the article which he
is buying to have certain qualities, the
vendor impliedly affirms that it has these
qualities, and it cannot matter whether
the article is a food or drink, or an article
to wear, or any other article. No vendee
will willingly buy, for the price of good
butter, a pound of rancid butter. But, it
would startle the students of the common
law to learn that persistence in selling a
pound of butter to a buyer of this kind
would be a tacit promise or affirmation by
the seller that the butter was sweet. From
the payment of the price of a good article
and from knowledge of the buyer's expectation to get a good article, no, warranty thatthe article tendered is good can
be implied. If there is no implied affirafation of sweetness of the butter, in the sale
of it with knowledge that the buyer think
he is getting sweet butter, and would not
take it otherwise, how could there be implied an affirmation of any other quality;
(e. g., freedom from unwholesome ingredients), from the knowledge that the buyer
is expecting to get butter free from such
ingredients ?
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The question before us is, not whether
there is an implied actual warranty, but
whether the courts will inventa warranty
for the purpose of making the seller liable
for the unwholesomeness of the food.
Afore particularly, the question is, whether
the courts will invent the warranty, not
that the vendor does not know of any unwholesomeness; not that he has made
due effort to discover any unwholesomeness, and has found none, but that the article is in fact sound, despite so latent an
unsoundness that with the utmost care
and skill it could not be discovered
Such a warranty has, so far as we have
discovered, not yet been thrust on a vendor by the law of Pennsylvania. Why
should we thrust it on him ?
The ordinary retail dealer in articles of
food, can in fact know but little concerning theirqualities. He buys his hams,
e. g., from a wholesaler, in a distant city.
The utmost that can be expected of him
is to usb care in selecting a reputable
wholesale dealer. He cannot be expected
to have a microscopic examination made
of every slice he sells for the detection of
trichinve, or other defects. He is not an
expert; the buyer knows that he is not an
expert, and that he has been compelled to
trust to the judgment and good faith of
parties who have earlier dealt with the
hams. Somebody has to take the risk of
defects existing despite reasonable efforts
to detect them. The consumer has not the
means of finding them out, but he has nearly as good means as the small retail dealer.
If he has taken a risk in buying, so has the
retailer. Why should the latter cast the
loss back from himself upon another, who
is equally free from negligence or any
blamable default?
Is it suggested that the retailer may
have his action over against the wholesaler?
But this is by no means clear. There are
decisions that confine the implied warranty to cases in which the sale is to the
consumer; and deny it in cases of sale to
the retailer, though it is known that he is
going to sell it to the consumer. But, even
if the law allowed to the retailer recourse
to his vendor, the vendor might be pecuniarily irresponsible.
It might be reasonable to hold that the
burden of showing reasonable care to discover the defects in articles of food should

be on the retailer, and that he should be
assumed to warrant that he had exercised
such care without discovering the defects.
But the case before us does not call for any
opinion upon this question.
Sundry dicta appear from time to time
to the effect that there is an implied warranty by the vender to the consumer, of
the wholesomeness of foods sold to the
latter. In some of the cases there was
fraud, or knowledge of the defect. The
cases, if there are any, which really decide
that, without respect to good faith, orcare,
or diligence of investigation, the vendor of
food articles to the consumer, warrants
their soundness, are very few. The principle has been rejected in Sheffer v. Willoughby, 163 Ill. 518, where a restaurateur
sold a poisonous oyster stew. Buckingham v. Water Co., 142 Pa. 221, denies the
liability of the water company to its consumers, for furnishing typhoid-fever-producing water, in the absence of negligence. The drinker of water should be as
much protected from poison, as the drinker
of beer, and a warranty of the soundness
of beer should no more be implied than
that of the soundness of water. While, in
the case last cited the action was trespass,
it was assumed that there was no liability
at all, except for negligence. Indeed, if
the law creates the duty of furnishing
sound edibles and potables, it cannot well
matter whether this duty is enforced
through the concept of a contract or of a
tort.
Many retailers are persons of small
means and limited education and ability.
It seems unreasonable to say to their neighbors, who know theirlimitations, that they
shall be liable for any damages that flow
fron' the unsoundness of articles sold by
them, though the highest care of men of
that class could not have detected that unsoundness. When a buyer goes to the
store of such a person he well knows that
that person has but poor means of discovering latent defects in the articles in which
he deals, and he should kniow that he himself must take a risk, as well as the retailer,
that he is unwittingly buying an unfit
article. Enough to require of retailers
that they exercise the largest diligence
practicable to men in their position in
learning the qualities of the articles sold
by them, that they sell nothing of whose
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soundness, after the exercise of this diligence, they have any suspicion, and that
they make it reasonably clear that they
have exercised this diligence and good
faith. It would be absurd to charge the
retailer with the heavy responsibility with
which the plaintiff seeks to charge him,
without giving him an effectual claim to
indemnification from the remoter dealer
from whom he bought.
If the consumer does not wish to take
any risks that things bought for food shall
be unwholesome, let him expressly stipulate for the warranty, and refrain from
buying from the retailer who refuses to enter into such a warranty. We are not
willing to put on the retailer the necessity
of answering for defects which are undiscoverable to his utmost diligence and care,
unless he takes the pains to exact from his
customer an explicit exoneration.
We have not considered the bearing of
the Act of May 4th, 1889, 2 P. & L. 4266,
upon the question involved. Whether the
court can take judicial notice that beer is
an article "used wholly or in part for
food," it is not now necessary to decide.
Judgment reversed.

SETZEt for plaintiff.
When parties contract that all disputes
shall be settled by an arbiter, his decision
shall be final. Monongahela Navigation
Co. v.Fenlon, 4 W. & S. 205.
When either party refuses to perform
according to the arbiter's award the other
party may sue for breach of the contract.
Preston v. Whitcomb, 11 Vt. 47; Grey v.
Reed, 65 Vt. 178 ; Zuckv. McClure, 98 Pa.
541; Howard v. Daly, 61 N. Y. 362.
A contractor is discharged when one of
the parties breaks an obligation which it
imposes, and he may remove all liabilities
under it. Vale on Pa. Law, Vol. 329.
WOLF for defendant.
Contract was entire, and plaintiff cannot
claim benefit of some of its provisions and
repudiate others. 37 Pa. 201 ; 112 Pa. 442;
17 S. & R. 45.
A limit may be placed upon the time
within which suit may be brought. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Erie, 203 Pa.
120; 130 Pa. 170.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

By the terms of the contract between
plaintiff and defendant what was to be
decided by the arbiters ?
First. All disputes as to the meaning
of the contract.
Second. All disputes as to performance.
Third. The validity of all claims, defalcations or set-off arising out of the contract. The contract further stipulated that
JACOB FOLEY vs. HENRY BROCK.
"should either sue he must sue within six
Contracts-Positionof arbiters-Provision months after the cause of action arose."
The plaintiff sues to recover the contract
for bringingsuit within a specified time.
price. Defense is, a failure to sue within
the term agreed upon. The law looks with
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
favor on the settlement by arbitration of
The parties made a contract for the ereccertain kinds of disputes; however, in our
latter.
the
for
a
house
of
former
the
by
tion
opinion, if plaintiff could not limit his
The contract provided that all disputes as
right to sue to a period short of that proto
peras
or
contract,
of
the
to meaning
formance of the contract, should be de- vided by our statute of limitations, he
could not insert a condition to that effect
cided by three persons named; and that
in his contract, provide for an arbiter to
each would release to the other all claims,
determine as to whether or not such conthe
of
out
arising
or
set-off
or defalcations,
dition was valid and thus do indirectly,
contract, except. such as these arbiters
through an arbiter, what he might not do
should determine to be valid. The work
was done, but, as Brock thought, imper- directly. Under this view a material question for our consideration is: May the
fectly, and he refused to pay the contract
plaintiff so limit his right to sue? In
price, claiming a reduction of $1,000 (the
Whitmore v. House Insurance Co., 148 Pa.
price was $5,800). The arbiters decided
405, the Insurance Co. stipulated in their
that the work was done according to conpolicy that insured should give notice of
tract and that Foley was to have the conany loss within (30) thirty days from fire,
tract price. The suit was brought in 18
or forfeit his right of action, and this was
months after Brock's refusal to pay. The
held a valid condition. Contracts of comcontract said that should either sue, he
mon carriers also usually contain provision
must sue within six months after the cause
similar, and such provisions are also held
of action arose.
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valid. We, therefore, decide this stipula- law for a breach of the contract, It only
tion, limiting plaintiff's right to sue to six
declared that in any dispute between the
months after the cause of action arose, to
contractor and the company the decision
be valid. Having so decided, the question
of the engineer should be obligatory and
remains- is the interpretation of that
conclusive, without further recourse or apclause for the arbiters or for this court? Is
peal; yet it was held that no action by one
this not a dispute arising out of the meanparty against the other would lie for a
ing of the contract? When did the cause
breach of the agreement; that the only reof action arise? Who is to say but the ar- sort was to the appointed tribunal.
biters? If plaintiff is allowed to recover
In the present action, plaintiff, alleging
in this action will the arbiters have dea breach of the contract on part of defendcided as to the validity or invalidity of any
ant, seeks to recover on on implied conalleged defalcation on the part of plaintract in an action at law, and without the
tiff? Certainly not. It might be said that
arbiters having passed on the alleged
when these contracting parties used the
breach. Applying the doctrine of the
words, "should either sue, he must sue
foregoing cases as we see it, our opinion is
within six months," they contemplated
that plaintiff must resort to the arbiters
the bringing of an action at law. But tie
for a decision of the question in dispute,
instrument must be construed as a whole
at least as a condition precedent to the
and with reference to the intention of the
bringing of ai action at law.
parties when it was made; and their intenJudgment is therefore directed in favor
tion, so construed, undoubtedly was to
of defendant.
P. L. TYLER, J.
avoid litigation, costs and delays incident
to actions at law. We therefore refuse to put
OPINION OF THE SUPREMtE COURT.
any other forced construction on the conOne of the provisions of the contract is
tract. The plaintiff does not allege that
that if either party should sue, he should
he has made any attempt to have these
sue within six months after the cause
arbiters, his chosen tribunal, decide this
of action arose. The cause of action,
dispute, but in the face of this stipulation,
Brock's refusal to pay, arose eighteen
which he is as much bound to affirm as
months before the suit was brought. The
any other clause in the article, he seeks a
action is therefore too late if the courts
recovery in an action at law. In Reynolds
will enforce this sort of a stipulation.
et al., Exrs. v. Caldwell, 51 Pa. 298, the
The question is, not whether, if the
contract provided that all disputes between
parties make such an agreement, and it is
the parties and relative thereto should be
broken, an action for damages will be
decided by an arbiter named, whose de- entertained, but whether the court will
cision should be final, and the parties
specifically enforce it.
The damages
waived any right of an action at, law. The
would, probably in every case, equal the
court held that even the misconduct of the
sum recovered in any suit. It would be
arbiter would not deprive defendants of a
idle to allow a recovery by A against B, and
right secured to them by the contract, viz:
then allow B to sue for damages equal to
a right of exemption from liability to any
the amount he paid to A in satisfaction of
suit upon it, and if the arbiter undertook
A's judgment. A foolish circuity is preto act and fraudulently injured plaintiff, vented by the court's refusing to entertain
he had a remedy by action against the
the suit which has been brought in violaguilty agent, but not by suit on the contion of the contract.
tract. It was also said that "it is of prime
A more serious question is whether a
importance that parties shall be held
contract limiting the term for suing
to their contracts. If permitted to cut
should be held valid. That it is valid has
themselves loose from an onerous stipula- been too often decided to justify our treating
tion, because it may be inconvenient to
the question as still open. Barber Asphalt
perform it, there can be no certainty in
Paving Co. v. Erie, 203 Pa. 120.
agreements." Also in the Monongahela
The arbitration provided for was simply
Navigation Co. v. Fenton, 4 W. & S. 205,
to ascertain any defalcations, set-offs or
the agreement to submit did not contain
damages, and not the meaning of the
any express waiver of the right to sue at
clause concerning the inception of the suit

56

THE FORUM

within six months, nor when the right of
action accrued. The arbitration has been
had, and the latter question has not been
submitted to the arbitrators. Even if, according to the terms of the agreement to
submit, this question might have been
submitted, the parties have waived the
submission.
The parties have agreed to submit and
have accordingly submitted the alleged
imperfectnessof the plaintiff's compliance
with the contract, to the three arbitrators.
They have decided that it was not imperfect. The cases are clear that after such
a stipulation, the parties cannot, usually,
resort to a suit before submitting the dispute according to its terms. A fortiori,
if they have submitted the controversy,
neither can maintain a suit which impliedly affirms the inaccuracy of the decision. Garven v. Pierson, 166 Pa. 258;
English v. Wilmerding School District,
165 Pa. 21.
The points agitated having been well
decided by the learned court below the
judgment is affirmed.

FLYNN and JAME]S for plaintiff.
The act of 1901, P. L. 67, removes the
necessity of a separate acknowledgment
by a married woman.
Upon a bill for specific performance,
where defendant has placed it out of his
power to perform the contract, the defendant is nevertheless liable for damages and
such damages may be ascertained in
equity. Macguire v. Henty, 163 Pa. 381;
Fitzpatrick v. Enaland, 4 D. R. 187;
Clark v. Martin, 49 Pa. 289.
HoucK and AmERmAN for defendants.
A married woman may not mortgage or
convey her real property unless her husband joins in such mortgage or conveyance. Act of June 28th, 1893, P. & L.,
Vol. 1, 2887.
Bills for specific performance will not
be inforced in equity where the contract is
such that specific performance would be
a nulity. Pom. Eq. Jur., Vol. 3, 1405;
also note page 1.50. Fisher v. Worrall, 5
W. &S. 486; Weller v. Weyland, 2 Gr. 103.
OPINION O" THE COURT.

Two interpretations are put upon these
facts by counsel for plaintiff and defendants. The plaintiff's claiming that the
facts do not state whether or not the husbands joined in the contract of sale, and
that, therefore, they have a right to preJOHN ISLIP vs. REBECCA TARIFF
sume that they did.
and SUSAN JOLIFF
If it can be assumed from the following
clause in the facts: "Though both women
Spceific performance-Power of married were married, only Susan Joliff separately
woman to contract-Equityjurisdiction acknowledged the contract," that both
extends to the parties to the contract husbands executed the contract of sale,
the fact that only Susan Joliff acknowlonly.
edged separately, would not under act of
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
1901, invalidate the contract, for that act
removes the necessity of a seperate acDefendant, co-tenants of a house, on
knowledgment by the wife. If this can
April 12, 1902, agreed in writing to convey
be assumed, then specific performance
it'on August 1, 1902, to plaintiff for $3000,
could be granted to compel parties to exeof which each was to recieve one-half.
cute the deed under their contract, but We
Through both women were married,
believe such is not the correct interpretaonly Susan Joliff separately acknowledged
tion of the facts.
the contract. Rebecca Tariff changed her
The facts are that Rebecca Tariff refused
-mind, and when the money was tendered
to make the deed, alleging she was not
on August 1, 1902, by Islip, declined to
bound because Mrs. Joliff was not. Why
receive it, or to make the deed, alleging
did Mrs. Tariff allege this?
that she was not bound because Mrs.
If both husbands had joined in the
Joliff was not.
executory contract of sale it must be adThe latter was willing to make the deed,
mitted that Mrs. Tariff would not have
but Islip refused it until both defendants
alleged this. She evidently knew that
should unite in its execution.
Mrs.Joliff's husband had not joined in
Mrs. Joliff's husband was unwilling to
the executory contract and refused to do
execute the deed, but Rebecca Tariff's was
so, as later on the facts say, he refused to
willing.
join in the execution of the deed. From
Bill in equity to compel the execution
this view of the facts it is clear that the
of the deed by both the defendants.
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husbands were not parties to the contract
of sale and hence the plaintiff's interpretation of the facts is erroneous.
We will therefore proceed under the interpretation of the facts that the husbands
were not parties to the executory contract.
This is a bill in equity to compel execution of the deed by both defendants, when
the husband of one of'defendants refuses
to join in the execution.
Act of June 8th, 1893, provides as follows: "Hereafter amarried woman shall
have the same right and power as an unmarried person to acquire, etc.,

*

*

"

but she may not mortgage or convey her
real estate, unless her husband joins in such
mortgage or conveyance."
Mrs. Joliff's husband is unwilling to
execute the deed, we know of no means
by which to enforce him to so execute,
and if deed should be executed by Mrs.
Joliff and Mrs. Tariff aud the husband of
one, it will not be valid against both
parties, and the decree for which the
plaintiffs ask, that is, "to compel the execution of the deed by both the defendants," will not lie when contract is such
that specific performance would be a
nullity.
In Weller v.Weyaud, 2 Grant 103, it is
held that a vendee is not entitled to
specific performance where the wife refuses to sign.
The same principle is laid down in
Fisher v. Worrell, 5 W. & S. 486; Clark v.
Sierer, 7 Watts 107, and Riesy's Appeal,
73 Pa. 486.
We think the same principle applies
where it is the husband who refuses to
sign. Bill is dismissed.
PRICKETT, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.
The act of Feb. 24th, 1770, P. & L. 1537,
was passed to regulate the practice in the
exercise of the already existing power of
married women to convey their estates in
land. It provided for a joint execution
and delivery by husband and wife of a
deed for the wife's property, the separate
examination of the wife as to her voluntary action and the official certificate of
that fact by the officer taking the acknowledgment. The joinder of the husband is made necessary, not merely to bar
his right of curtesy, as the joinder of the
wife in the husband's deeds is necessary

to bar her right of dower, but in order
that the deed may not be absolutely void.
Peck v. Ward, 18 Pa. 506; Selp v. Campbell, 19 Pa. 361.
The acts of April 11, 1848, June 3, 1887,
and June 8, 1893, "put an end to the husband's common law present estate in his
wife's land" but they made no change in
the method of conveyance of her land as
directed by the act of 1770. Bingler v.
Bowman, 194 Pa. 212. The purpose of
requiring the husband's joinder in the
deed was to prevent the wife from selling
her land without her husband's consent.
Here, Mr. Joliff refuses to join his wife in
the execution of a deed, and as he does
not appear to have been a party to the
original contract, a decree of specific performance as against Alrs. Joliff would be
to order the axecution of an instrument
worthless to transfer any estate.
Before April 4, 1901, it is clear that the
unacknowledged contract of a married
woman for the sale of her land was not
binding upon her, whether her husband
was a party to such contract or not.
Bigler v. Bowman, supra. The object of
requiring her separate examination and
acknowledgment was to prevent her being
coerced by her husband to make a sale
against her will. On April 4, 1901, an act
was passed, providing that "acknowledgments of any married woman of any
deeds, mortgages, or other instruments required by law to be acknowledged, shall
be taken in the same manner and form as
though said married woman were feme
sole, etc."
Now a married woman's
executory contract to convey her lands
had always been an "instrument required
by law to be acknowledged." A direct
application of the language of the act
forces the conclusion that such contract is
still required to be acknowledged though
the separate examination is dispensed
with.
In the case of men or femes sole, their
deeds are valid without any acknowledgment, the customary acknowledgment
being simply a preliminary to recording.
A fortiori,no acknowledgment of their informal contracts to sell is necessary. But
in the case of married women the act of
1770 has made the acknowledgment of the
deed by both husband and wife an indispensable requisite to the validity of the
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deed. It is then asked, "Is such an acknowledgment of the contract to convey
equally essential?" So long as the legislature recognized the danger of the coercion of the wife by the husband, it is clear
that specific performance of a contract to
sell her land would not be decreed unless
she had declared that such contract was
voluntary, for otherwise the coercion of
the husband would simply be directed to
securing her contract to convey and the
purpose of the act of 1770 would be defeated. But by the act of 1901 the legislature has impliedly stated that the danger of husbands coercing their wives is a
thing of the past.
In Glidden v. Struples, 52 Pa. 400, it is
said: "A married woman has no capacity
to contract for the sale of her real estate
or to convey it, except in the statutory
mode conferring the power." But at the
date of this case her contracts in general
were void, and of course the act of 1770
would not help her if she failed to comply
with its requirements. By the acts of
1887 and 1893, however, her contractual
power is made general, the formality required in her deeds being expressly preserved as an exception. It may, therefore,
be argued that since the act of 1770 governs
merely the form of the execution of her
deed, and since her separate examination
is no longer required, there is no present
reason why specific performance should
not be decreed against a woman whose
husband has joined in her contract, or who
(as does Mr. Tariff here) expresses his willCessante raingness to join in her deed.
tione legis, cessat ipsa lex.
Of course, parol evidence of the husband's consent to the wife's execution of a
deed can be no substitute for his signature
to the deed, as required by the statute.
Glidden v. Struples, supra. But this objection does not apply to her contract to
convey. We are of the opinion, therefore,
that if the complainant desires it, he may
have a decree of specific performance as
against Mrs. Tariff, upon the tender of
$1,500. Were not the proportionate interests of the defendants in the land in question disclosed by the record, we could not
make this decree. We are not, however,
confronted by this difficulty.
Notwithstanding the foregoing conclusion, since the complainant appears unwill-

ing to accept any relief less than the deed
of both defendants, the judgment of the
lower court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
COLEMAN

vs. FIRANKLIN

BANK.

Duty of a drawer of a check to know the
payee-Liability of a bank for payment
of a fraudulentlyindorsed check-Effect
of negligence of the drawer.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Louis Ferguson, representing himself to
be John Wanamaker, went to A. 3. Coleman for a loan of money, giving the occupation and residence of John Wanamaker
as his own. Coleman, upon investigation,
found John Wanamaker to be a prosperous and responsible merchant of Philadelphia. Having never seen John Wanamaker nor his picture, Coleman hands
Ferguson a check for $1,000, payable to the
order of John Wanamaker, whom he supposed Ferguson to be. Fergusonendorses
the check in the name of John Wanimaker, and sells it to one Hamilton, who
has it cashed at the defendant (Franklin)
Bank. The drawee (Coleman) brings this
action to compel the bank to credit him
with the amount of the check.
HASSERT and McDoNATD for plaintiff.
A depositor has the right to assume,
when checks are returned to him by the
bank, that it has ascertained the genuineness of the indorsements. Shipmen v.
Bank, 12 L. R. A. 791.
Money paid out on a forged indorsement
of a depositor's check cannot, in the absence of negligence on the part of the depositor, be charged against him. Am. &
Eng. Ency. of Law, p. 1077.
If a bank pay a check upon which the
name of the payer is forged, the depositor
may recover money so paid. Morgan v.
Bank, 11 N. Y. 404; Bank v. Green, 3
Penny. 456.
CAREY and SipES for the defendant.
Where one is induced by fraud to make
a check to another, who is acting underan
assumed name, and the check is indorsed
in the assumed name, the maker is held to
intend to deal with the person with whom
he isactually dealing; and payment by the
bank, on the indorsement of the assumed
name, is a good payment. States v.Bank
of Montrose, 17 Sup. 256; Trust Co. v.
Bank, 196 Pa. 230.
Where the forgery can be traced to the
fault or negligence of the drawer, he cannot fix the liability for his default upon the
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bank, but must bear the loss himself.
Trust Co. v. Midland, 117 Mass. 448.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

We think the question to be decided
here is whether or not Coleman was guilty
of negligence, when he gave Ferguson
the check. True, Coleman satisfied himself that John Wanamaker was all right,
but was it his duty to satisfy himself that
Ferguson was all right? We think it was.
If Coleman, upon investigation, had
found out that the person asking for the
check was not John Wanamaker, it is
quite certain that the check would never
have been given.
But Coleman did part with the check.
Now, to whom did he give it, to Wanamaker or to Ferguson? He certainly, in
the eyes of the law, gave the check to the
person before him, namely, Ferguson. It
is a perverted statement to say that the
check was John Wanamaker's, and that
none other was entitled to receive payment. As a matter of fact John Wanamaker was not entitled to it; nobody was
entitled to it; it should not have been
given. It was no fault of the defendant's
that it was given; it was not-as we will
show below-the defendant's fault that it
was paid; and consequently the defendant
cannot be held liable for its payment.
Land Title & Trust Co. v. Bank, 196 Pa
230 ; Iron City Nat. Bank v. Fort Pitt, 159
Pa. 47.
Furthermore, as a matter of right the
plaintiff cannot recover. He intended to
give Ferguson the $1,000-and if he had
had in his possession that amount of
money it is reasonable to suppose that he
would have given him the money instead
of the check. Why then say that the
defendant bank should be made to account for the fault or misfortune of the
plaintiff?
Did the plaintiff give this check rather
than the money, because he was suspicious
of Ferguson? If so, then too, he cannot
recover, as he gave to one, whom he
dared not trust, the means of perpetrating
a fraud upon others.
On the other hand was the defendant
bank negligent or in any way at fault?
We cannot see that it was. The fact that
Hamilton was a bona fide purchaser for
value-it is presumed he was--certainly
makes it unnecessary for the bank to go be-
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hind Hamilton's indorsement, unless it
had, or should have had, knowledge of
fraud. There is nothing here to show
that Hamilton's part of the transaction
was not entirely square and above board.
Emporio Nat. Bank v. Shortwell, 35 Kan.
360; Maloney v. Clark & Co., 6 Kan. 82;
Robertson v. Coleman, 141 Mass. 231.
Judgment for the defendant.
BARNHART, P. J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

Ferguson, calling himself John Wanamaker, and giving for his occupation and
residence those of John Wanamaker, the
well known merchant, but not otherwise
representing himself to be him, obtained
the check from Coleman, payable to John
Wanamaker. Ferguson, in substance, represented himself to be the John Wanamaker, as the jury might well find, for
Ferguson's assumption of this name and
his declaration that his residence and his
business were what those of Wanamaker
were, could not well be otherwise interpreted by Coleman. Coleman's check was,
hence, obtained by a gross fraud. Nevertheless, he intended the man before him to
receive the $1,000, and he inserted in it the
name John Wanamaker, in order that this
man might obtain it. He intended, of
course, that this man should indorse the
check in the name, "John Wanamaker,"
since otherwise he could not obtain the
money from the bank. When the check,
being thus indorsed, the bank paid it, it
did precisely what Coleman intended it
to do. Why then should it not be allowed
to withhold a similar amount of Coleman's
deposit?
If, the check being presented, it had insisted on knowing whether the presenting
party was the party intended by Coleman,
what could it have done? It might have
sent Ferguson with a messenger to Coleman, and inquired of him whether the
former was the payee intended. And what
information would it have received? The
jury would have been warranted in inferring that it would have received from Coleman a statement corresponding with the
fact, viz : that the bearer (Ferguson) was
the intended payee. How can it be
said, then, that the bank's negligence
ought to make it bear the loss, when, had
it been diligent, it would have received a
direction to pay to Ferguson and the loss
would have fallen on Coleman?
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If, after giving the check, Coleman began to suspect that his payee was not John
Wanamaker, what was his duty ? Plainly,
to hasten to his bank and countermand
the check. This he did not do, and the
only inference permissible is that he had
not begun to suspect that he had been imposed upon. It is clear, therefore, that an
inquiry from him by the bank would have
resulted in the repetition of his command
in the check, viz: to pay the money to the
payee. If he had suspected, and still took
no steps to stop the payment of the check,
he would have been negligent, and his
negligence ought to precludd his recovery
from the bank, which, but for it, would
not have paid the check. Land Title Co.
v. Nat. Bank, 196 Pa. 230. In a note to
50 L. R. A. 75, the doctrine is well stated
"that the drawer of a check, draft or bill
of exchange who delivers it toan impostor,
supposing him to be the person whose
name he has assumed, must, as against
the drawee or a bona fide holder, bear the
loss, where the impostor obtains payment
of or negotiates the same." Cf. Barrews
v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 58 L. R.
An. 433 (Minn.)
We have considered the case as if it involved the presentment of the check to
and the reception of payment from, the
bank by the payee himself. The relevant principle is the same, though in fact
the payee sold the check to Hamilton, and
Hamilton received the money from the
bank. Hamilton, .as a bona fide holder,
would be protected in buying it as fully as
the bank in paying it, and though had the
check been countermanded before payment, he could not have compelled the
bank to pay it; he could have compelled
Coleman as its drawer to pay it. The bank
has done for Coleman what he would thus
have otherwise been compellable to do.
He cannot, therefore, recover the money
from thebank. Theopinionof the learned
court below judiciously disposes of all the
questions involved, and its judgment is
affirmed.

TONEY vs. LAPSLEY.
Irespass- When propertly is acquired in
animals ferce naturme- What plaintiff
must show to recover for conversion qf
same-Act of May 25, 1887.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Toney, gunning, shot a wild goose and
disabled it so that it descended gradually
to a field a quarter of a mile from where
Toney stood when lhe fired. Lapsley was
in the road within twenty feet of the
point at which the goose fell and captured
it. Toney coining up demanded it as his
bird. Lapsley refused to give it up. This
is trespass for the conversion of the goose.
REESER for the plaintiff.

The possession necessary to acquire
right of property in animals ferce naturca
does not mean actual bodily seizure, but
wounding or ensnaring an animal so as to
prevent its escape is sufficient. Pierson v.
Post, 3 Cai. (N. Y.) 175; Am. & English
Ency. of Law; Vol. 2, page 342.
Wild animals when reclaimed and reduced to possession become the subject of
larceny. 4 Black Com. 294; Haywood v.
State, 41 Ark. 479; Harvey v. Coin., 23
Grant. (Va.)
During the existence of a qualified property in animals ferce naturcp it is under
the protection of the law, and every invasion of it is redressible. Goff v. Kitts,
15 Wend. 550.
RENO for the defendant.

The plaintiff must show either title or
right to possession. If he fails he cannot
recover in conversion. Castor v. MeShaffer, 48 Pa. 437, vide Bigelow in Torts under
conversion.
This he has not done, as pursuit alone
vests no property or right in the huntsman, even when accompanied by wounding. 8 L. R. A. 448 (notes); Wallis v.
Meare, 3 Binney 546.
The pursuer must have wounded the
animal so as to have brought it within his
power and control. Pierson v. Post, 3
Cal. 175.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The question submitted for determination is, whether the plaintiff by shooting
and disabling a wild goose and going into
immediate pursuit, in the manner alleged
in the statement of facts, acquired such a
right'to or property in, the bird as will
sustain an action against defendant for
capturing and refusing to deliver it on demand.
It is admitted that a wild goose is an
animal ferce naturce and that property in
such animals is acquired by occupancy or
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possession only. These admissionslimit the
discussion to the question what acts
amount to possession, as applied to acquiring a right to wild animals.
The elements necessary for possession
are: "That a man must stand in a certain
physical relation to the object and to the
rest of the world and must have a certain
intent." Holmes on Common Law.
Almost all the jurists in general jurisprudence agree, that the animal must
have been brought within the power of
the pursuer, before the property in the
animal vests. Actual bodily seizure may
not in all cases be requisite; but all concur
in declaring that mere pursuit, without
bringing the animal within the power or
dominion of the gunner, is not sufficient.
The possession must be so far established
that the animal cannot escape.
In Pierson v. Post, 3 Caines (N. Y.)
175, Justice Thompson ruled, "The possession necessary to acquire a right of
property in animalsferce naturce does not
mean actual bodily seizure, but wounding
an animal so as to prevent its escape is
sufficient."
The civil law contained the same principles. But it was a question in the
Roman law, whether an animal fera
nature belonged to him that had wounded
it so that it might easily be taken. The
civilians at first differed on the question,
but finally came to the conclusion that
the property in the wounded wild animal
should vest in the pursuer. As far back
as in Young v. Hichens, 6 Queen's Bench,
606, we find it held that, "he that pursues or wounds a wild beast is not thereby
proprietor unless he has brought it in his
power, as if he had killed or wounded it to
death or otherwise given the effectual
cause, whereby it cannot use its motive
freedom." "Property can be acquired in
animals ferce naturce, by occupancy only;
and that in order to constitute such an
occupancy it is sufficient if the animal is
deprived of his natural liberty, by wounding, so that he is brought within the
power and control of the pursuer." Buster
v. Newkirk, 20 Johnson (N. Y.) 75, also 2
Kent's Comm. 349.
In all these citations it appears that a
strong probability of complete capture is
enough to give a right of possession
against a party preventing the capture.
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"The law in this country with regard to
property in wild animals is in league with
that of England, except that which is
changed by statutory regulations," and as
there are no such enactments in this
State, the cases cited must govern the one
at bar. Rexroth v. Coon, 15 R. I. 35, 37,
23 At. 37.
Applying then these principles to our
case, we are of opinion, from a fair interpretation of facts, that Toney can recover
in this action, having mortally wounded
the goose, given immediate pursuit and
having had the animal within his power
of capture, as it does appear almost certain, that having the right to possession,
he would have gained actual possession
but for the wrongful act of Lapsley.
It might be well to state, that there is a
distinction between wounding an animal
so as to prevent its escape, and a disabling
of it. In the latter case there might be
presented an opportunity of escape; but
after a careful analysis of facts we construe
the term disable, in view of the circumstances, as meaning mortally wounding.
Whether the owner of the field in which
the goose fell acquired any property in the
bird we are not called upon to discuss;
but we dismiss the question by declaring
that, as to him, Toney would have a better
claim than Lapsley.
We, therefore, are determined to place
possession of animals ferce natura' in the
one first seeing, disabling and pursuing,
so as to deprive them of their natural
liberty and subject them to the control of
their pursuer, and should thereby afford a
basis of an action against one interfering
with such right of possession.
Judgment is accordingly entered for
plaintiff.
McNEALX, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

By the act of May 25th, 1887, P. &. L.
Dig. Prac. 97, the distinctions between
actions ex delicto were abolished, and trespass, trover and case were amalgamated
into the common form of trespass. However, the change was one relating to procedure only, and so we are still dependent
upon the law as it was to determine
whether an action will lie under the form
of trespass to remedy the wrong formerly
falling under the above heads. The present action corresponds to what was formerly trover and conversion of personal

62

THE

FORUM

property, and it is necessary, therefore, to
determine what are the requisites for such
form of action, According to all the authorities, the requisites are two-(l), the
plaintiff must show property, absolute or
special in himself; (2), he must show a
wrongful conversion by the defendant.
Brightly's Ed. Troubat and Haly's Practice, See. 1561. We may dispense with a
discussion of the latter of these points, for
it is admitted by the statement of facts
that if the first point is established, there
was a conversion, a demand by the plaintiff and refusal to deliver by the defendant. Jacoby v. Taussat, 6 S. & R. 300.
The question, in short, then, is whether or
not the plaintiff had property, either absolute or special, in the wild goose shot,
the subject matter of the alleged conversion. The general principles of law relative to the acquisition of property rights in
wild animals have been very accurately
and lucidly expounded by the learned
court below, and any further discussion by
us would be the work of supererogation.
The only doubt that may be expressed is
as to the application of thelaw to thefacts
admitted. To acquire property in a wild
animal it must be reduced to possession;
mere pursuit or wounding of the animal
is not sufficient. Possession is defined as
"the physical control which belongs of
right to unqualified ownership; the having a thing in such a manner as to exclude
the control of other persons; that detention of or dominion over a thing by one
person which precludes others from the
adverse physical occupancy of or dominion
over it." Century Dict. Although not
having actual or manual possession of the
goose after the firing of the shot, may it
not reasonably be said the animal was
then within the control of the hunter?
The natural protection of a bird is its
ability to fly. If deprived of this function,
not being of a ferocious nature, would it
not then be under the dominion of the
person disabling it? "But the difference
between the power over the object which
is sufficient for possession, and that which
is not, is clearly one of degree only, and
the line may be drawn at different places
at different times." Holmes' Common
Law, p. 217. Verily, one who had simply
wounded a lion or bear sufficient to impede locomotion could hardly be said to

be in possession, legally or actually, of the
wounded animal. We are disposed to
agree with the application of the law to
the facts as interpreted by the learned
court below. By disabling the goose the
plaintiff effectually gained dominion over
it, and conversely the defendant's "capturing" the bird is to mean he merely picked
it up in its disabled and helpless condition.
In law, therefore, it may be said the plaintiff had possession of the animal from the
point of time immediately following the
firing of the shot. This possession was
disturbed by the defendant, the plaintiff's
property right denied, and the appropriate remedy is trover. It is unnecessary to
discuss the rights of the owner of the
ground upon which the bird fell, for whatever remedy he may have, it is not for the
conversion of personal property to which
he never had title. The question of title
is solely between plaintiff and defendant,
and we think the plaintiff shows the better
right.
Judgment affirmed.
JOSEPH TEMPLE vs. ABRAM
CORNLER.
Landlord and tenant-Liability of landlord to repairon his own promise-Remedies of tenantin such case-Tenant canno t recoverfor injuriesreceived by breach
of such promise in an action of tort, the
action must be in contract-Contributory
negligence on tenant'spart.will bar recovery.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Cornier rented a house for three years to
Temple, agreeing to repair a stairway,
which was visibly weak. Nothing being
done for six months after the possession
was taken by Temple, he reminded Cornler of his promise, and demanded that he
should perform. Cornler denied making
the promise, but said he would repair.
Six more months ran by without repair,
when the wife of Temple, coming down
the stairs, they fell in, and she was dangerously hurt. This is an action of trespass.
SIPES for plaintiff.
The landlord is liable to his tenant for
an injury flowing from a failure to keep
the building in a proper state of repair.
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The landlord may render himself liable
for repairs by an agreement to that effect.
PARK for defendant.
The agreement of the landlord to repair
does not avail where the lessee knows of
Caveat
the defects at time of letting.
emptor applies to this kind of contract.
Wein v. Simpson, 2 Phila. 158.
If tenant continues to use premises,
knowing the defective condition, and is
injured, his contributory negligence will
bar a recovery.
Akerly v. White, 58
Hun. 362.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

It is a general rule that where there is
no warranty implied in the letting of
premises that they are reasonably fit for
use. The lessee takes an estate in the
premises hired, and takes the risk of the
quality of the premises, in the absence of
an express or implied warranty by the
lessor, or of deceit. A lessee, therefore,
if he is injured, by reason of the unsafe condition of the premises hired, cannot maintain an action against the lessor,
in the absence of warranty or of misrepresentation.
The plaintiff admits the general rule,
but contends that this case is taken out of
it, because, at the time of the letting, the
defendant agreed to repair and put in a
safe condition the stairway, which was
visibly weak, the unsafe condition of
which caused the injury. The contract
relied on was a loose one; it fixed no time
within which the repairs were to be made.
But, if we assume that the contract was to
make the repairs within a reasonable time,
then the jury would bejustified to say that
the defendant had not performed it within
a reasonable time.
We then come to another question,
whether for such a breach the plaintiff can
maintain an action of tort to recover for
personal injuries to his wife by reason of
the defective condition of the stairway.
The cases are numerous and confusing as
to the dividing line between actions arising
out of a contract and those arising out of
a tort. There are many cases where a man
may have his election to bring either action. Where the cause of action arises
merely from a breach of promise, the action is in contract.
The action of tort has for its foundation
the negligence of the defendant, and this
means more than a mere breach of promise, otherwise the failure to meet a note, or
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any other promise to pay money, would
sustain an action of tort for the negligence,
and thus the promiser would be made
liable for all cousequential damages arising
from such failure. As a general rule, there
must be some active negligence or misfeasance to support tort. There must be
some breach of duty distinct from breach
of contract. In the case at bar, the utmost
shown against the defendant is that there
was unreasonable delay on his part in performing an executory contract. As we
see, he is not liable by reason of the relation of lessor and lessee, but his liability,
if any, must rest solely upon a breach of
contract. If the defendanthad performed
the work contemplated by his contract
unskillfully and negligently, he would be
liable to an action in tort. Such was the
case in Gill v. Middleton, 105 Mass. 477;
Ashley v. Root, 4 Allen 504. There is no
warranty implied in the letting of an unfurnished house or tenement that it is
reasonably fit for use. Doupe v. Genin,
45 N. Y. 119; Dutton v. Gerish, 9 Cush.
89.
We think the rule of caveat emptor
would apply in the absence of any warranty expressed or implied, the buyer
takes the risk of quality upon himself.
Height v. Bacon, 126 Mass. 10; Wein v
Simpson, 2 Phila. 158.
The rule does not apply to cases of fraud.
:Neither does it apply to the sale or delivery of dangerous or noxious articles. It is
held that where a man delivers an article
which he knows to be dangerous or noxious
to another person, without notice of its
nature or qualities, he is liable for an injury which may reasonably be contemplated as likely to result, and which does,
in fact, result therefrom to that person or
any other who is not himself at fault.
Wellington v. Drumer Kerosene Co., 104
Mass. 64.
In the case at bar all parties knew of its
danger, that the defendant did not conceal
his knowledge that the tenement was
otherwise, in order to induce the lessee to
hire and occupy it.
When a house is infected with smallpox the danger to life is from a cause that
cannot be discovered by the tenant from
any examination he may make. Spring
guns might be set in traps, orother contrivances might exist which would injure
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the most careful occupant. If the landlord
knew of such, it might be held to be his
duty to give information to the tenant.
Such traps or contrivances are not merely
a want of repair, they are, in a sense,
active agencies of mischief, which no tenant would expect to find even in a decayed
and ruinous tenement. But, as we had
stated before, without undertaking to determine the limits of this exception to the
general rule, we think the case at bar is
not within this exception.
Buildings are let in all sorts of conditions, and the law is unreasonably strict in
exempting the landlord from liability for
injuries arising from defects when there is
no warranty and no actual deceit.
The plaintiff, therefore, has no right to
go to the jury upon the questions of warranty and deceit, and there is no evidence
of any warranty that the stairs were safe,
or of any deceit or misrepresentation on
the part of the defendant. An action of
tort will not lie for the total failure of the
landlord to repair, according to his agreement. Schick v. Fleischhauer, 26 N. Y.
210.
In the case at bar the plaintiff had two
remedies-() the remedy of a tenant for
breach of landlord's agreement to repair,
is either for himself to make the repairs at
the cost of the landlord, and recoup his
damages in an action by the landlord for
rent, or to bring an action ex-contractu to
recover such damages which he has sustained thereby; or (2) where the landlord
is under an agreement to repair, and fails
to do so, and the premises in consequence
thereof become untenantable, the tenant
may abandon the premises without liability for further rent. Brolasky v. Loth,
5 Phila. 81; 19 L. I. 117.
The plaintiff in this case cannot recover
for the personal injuries of his wife, when
she herself was guilty of contributory negligence. Where the facts are admitted and
undisputed, several conclusions follow :
(1). The plaintiff's wife was the producing agent whose act caused the injury.
She well knew the fact that the stairway
was visibly weak.
(2). The plaintiff's wife had at least as
good, and, indeed, better opportunities for
knowing the condition of those stairs.
(3). That the defendantwas notifiedby
the plaintiff of its condition, and it follows
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from that, that plaintiff's wife knew same.
(4). The plaintiff admits that he knew
the condition of those stairs, and they were
in a dangerous condition, and for which
he owed a duty to his wife to so notify her
of the danger. If he failed in so doing, he
neglected his duty, with obvious carelessness, and was, therefore, responsible for
the results. Oil City Gas Co. v. Robinson,
99 Pa. 1 ; Mitchell v. Stuart, 187 Penna.
217.
A tenant who has knowledge of a defective condition of the premises is guilty
of contributory negligence in using or occupying them without repair, and is,
therefore, not entitled to recover for injuries sustained. Hahn v. Roach, 7 North.
Co. 21; P. & L. Digest of Dec., 17983-318.
Damages for personal injuries to the tenant, resulting from the failure of the landlord to repair, are deemed too remote
and consequential, and not in contemplation with the parties, and therefore not
recoverable. Kabus v. Frost, 50 N. Y. 74
(Sup.) Spellman v. Beningan, 36 (Hun.)
174.
In no case shall the tenant be allowed to
recover for personal injuries when he himself was guilty of contributory negligence.
Mitchell v. Stewart, 187 Pa. 217.
In Coal Co. v. Jones, 86 Penna. 432, Mr.
Justice Mercur held to prove contributory
negligence evidence is admissible that the
deceased, at the time of the accident, was
in a position which he himself had
warned others to avoid as dangerous.
In Russell v. Hutchins, 15 W. N. C. 482,
the court held it was contributory negligence for a boy of 18 years of age to go
into a known dangerous place to work
against the advice of his father, but at the
solicitation of the pit boss.
In Fairview Coal Co. v. Biddle, 18 W.
N. C. 108, and in Township of Crescent v.
Anderson, 114 Pa. 643, held that one who
knows, or, by ordinary care, may know,
of a defect in a highway, and voluntarily
undertakes to test it, when it could be
avoided, cannot recover against the municipal authorities for losses incurred through
such defect.
The cases that are most similar to the
present one in their facts and circumstances are the following, which hold that,
although the landlord is liable if the
premises are so constructed or in such a
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condition at the date of the lease that their
continued use by the tenant must result
to the injury of a third person, yet the
landlord is not liable where the tenant has
been negligent in the use of the premises,
for not making repairs necessary to abate
the same. Krauss v. Brua, 107 Pa. 85;
Somes's Appeal, 6 W. N. C. 441; Tow v.
Roberts, 108 Pa. 489.
If the jury believe that the defendant's
wife had knowledge of the condition of
the stairs, and with such knowledge still
went on and used said stairs, such was
contributory negligence, and there cannot
be any recovery for her personal injuries.
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self from making the other liable to him
for the consequences. 34 L. R. A. 824. He
is bound to refrain from an act that may
enhance the damages that may follow
from the other's default Cf. Town v. Armstrong, 75 Mich. 580; Hahn v. Roach, 7
North. 21: Cook v. Soule, 56 N. Y. 420 ;
Kampinsky v. Hallo, 52; N.Y. 265.
Is it asked, was Temple bound to refrain
from the use of the stairs? The learned
court below has well answered. Temple
might have repaired the stairs, and either
set off the cost against the rent, or sued
for its recovery upon the lessor's covenant.
Possibly, if access to the upper portion of
D. E. KAUFMAN, J.
the house was possible by means of these
stairs
only, he could have treated himself
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
as evicted, and withdrawn from the premCornler orally agreed to repair the stair- ises
altogether, or contented himself with
way. He did not do so within the next
the occupancy of the down-stairs portion
twelve months. That he broke his con- of the house rent free. He had a right to
tract need hardly be said, and that for the continue to use the stairs,
but only at his
breach he is liable to the plaintiff is just as own risk. For ensuing harm
he could not
clear.
obtain compensation from Cornler.
But Temple's action is not ex contractu.
The various aspects of the problem beThe duty to repair did not exist independ- fore the
court have been so well considered
ently of the contract, and no tort of Temby it that further discussion by us is unple has occurred. He has not omitted
necessary.
something which he should, without conJudgment affirmed.
tract, have done. He has not done something which he ought not to have done, nor
REBECCA THROOP vs. WM. AND
done something which he might have or
JANE LE COMPTE.
ought to have done, in a negligent manner.
If guilt he has itis that of pure non-feasance
Trusts-Act of April 18, 1853, againstaccuof his contractual duty. He is liable,
mulation of rents and profits discussed
therefore, only for the breach of contract.
and interpreted-Trusteemay not pay
If this breach can be turned into a tort,
principal of trust fund over to lawful
the breach of any contract can, with equal
representatives of settler until all prior
propriety, be treated as a tort, e. g., pot to
limitationshave completely failed, and
pay a debt; not to deliver goods one has
especially where the intention of settler
contracted to sell. Many breaches of
would be defeated.
contract involve injury either to property
or person. The fact that a personal hurt
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
has been occasioned by the non-feasance of
Sarah Atlee, a widow, to whom dower
Cornler does not make the omission a tort. had been assigned, assigned her right to
Hahn v. Roach, 7 North. 21.
the annual payments to X, in trust, to inBut the hurt was not, in a proper sense, vest them, pay the interest to her daughcaused by the condition of the stairs. It
ter, Rebecca Throop, for life; then, to pay
would have been, had that condition been over the principal to any child of Rebecca,
unknown to Temple and his wife. But if any should survive her. If no children
they knew of their condition. The act of should survive her, then to pay the princiMrs. Temple in venturing upon them was pal over to herself, Sarah Atlee, should
the true cause of the damage. When one she be alive, or, if dead, to her lawful repman consciously gives the negligence or resentatives and heirs. Sarah Atlee has
omission of another a chance to hurt him, died. Rebecca has married and had a
by his own act or omission, he so far con- daughter, Salome. Salome has died. Mrs.
tributes to the result as to preclude him- Atlee has a brother and sister, Win. and
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Jane LeCompte, who still survive. The
trustee desires to pay the fund over to Rebecca Throop. Case stated to determine
whether she or the LeComptes are entitled.
LouRu
IuR for plaintiff.

There is no violation of the doctrine
against perpetuities, where there is no
possibility that the estate could be tied up
for a longer period than a life or lives in
being and twenty-one years afterwards.
Philips' Estate, 93 Pa. 45.
The next of kin of a person are ascertainable at any period, either during his
lifetime or after his death, which may be
named for the vestingof an estate. Supra,
93 Pa. 45.
The intention of the deed is the governing rule of construction, though it requires
formal words of limitation to make an estate of inheritance. Supra, 93 Pa. 45;
Rillyer v. Miller, 10 Barr 326; Brown v.
Williamson, 36 Pa. 338.
SDiITH for defendant.
The trust is in violation of the Act of
Assembly of Ap-ril 18, 1853, entitled "An
Act to regulate accumulations." Vol. Il.,
Peffer & Lewis Dig., Col. 4055.
Future estates limited on a life estate,
which are not sure to take effect in possession within twenty-one years and the
usual fraction, after the determination of
the life estate, are void in their creation.
Davenport v. Harris, 3 Grant 164; Philips'
Appeal, 93 Pa. 45; Mitcheson's Estate, 11
W. N. C.547.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The contention of counsel, for both plaintiff and defendant in this case, seems to be
whether or not the doctrine of act April
18, 1853, entitled "An Act regulating accumulations of trusts estates," applies, but,
after careful consideration, we cannot see
the applicability of said statute to case under contemplation.
Act April 18, 1853, provides, "No person
shall settle or dispose of any real or personal propeity

*

*

*

in such manner

that rents, issues, or profits shall wholly
or partially be accumulated for any longer
term than life or lives of any such grantor
*

*

*

and term of twenty-one years

after death of such grantor," etc.
The original grantor, Sarah Atlee, made
assignment of her dower right to a trustee,
with provision that interest of said assignment should go to her daughter, Rebecca,
for life, and at death of Rebecca, to pay the
principal to surviving child of Rebecca.
No denial will be made to fact that Sarah
Atlee had perfect legal right to accumu-

late such dower right during her life, nor
is it contrary to Act April 18, 1853.
Was any attempt made to accumulate
said fund longer than twenty-one years or
during minority of person to take? We
cannot see any such provision. Thelimit
of accumulation must cease within statutory period. The moment Sarah Atlee
shall die, annual payments derived from
her dower interest must cease coming into
hands of trustee, and he is to hold principal accumulated up to this time, pay the
interest to Rebecca Throop, for life, and
the principal to her child, if any, at her
death.
The reversion of the principal to Sarah
Atlee, upon contingency of Rebecca
Throop's death, without leaving to survive
a living child, can never occur, for Sarah
Atlee has since died.
Certainly, the payment of the life interest to Rebecca does not conflict with statute prohibiting accumulations.
We are inclined to believe, that because
of nature of trust estate in hands of trustee,
is an active trust, and as such should be
decided according to laws governing trusts.
Where a special duty is to be performed by
the trustee in respect to the estate, such as
to collect rents and profits or sell the estate, etc., the trust is called active. Tiedeman's Real Prop., p. 468; Williams' Appeal, 83 Pa. 377; Watson's Appeal, 125 Pa.
340.
Being such active trust, the duty of
trustee to the trust estate is such that he
must retain legal title, in order to perform
his duties, and the courts will not execute
the trust. Watson's Appeal, 125 Pa. 340.
Salome, daughter of Rebecca, and to
whom, according to assignment, estate
would have gone on death of her mother,
is dead ; but Rebecca Throop is still living,
and until her death the child named as
beneficiary can not be determined. No
particular child was named, and any child
of Rebecca surviving her will take principal in hands of trustee.
We, therefore, believe conclusion of reasoning to be that trustee shall retain principal and pay interest on same to Rebecca
Throop until her death; then, if there be
no child surviving at her death, the principal will be distributed according to intestate laws.
JOSEPH E. FLEiTZ, J.

THE FORUM
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The question presented by the facts of
this case has been strangely misapprehended. Sarah Atlee was entitled to sums
of money, payable at stated intervals.
These she conveyed to a trustee in trust to
invest them. They made the corpus of
the trust fund. There was no direction to
accumulate the interest arising from this
fund. On the contrary, it was to be paid,
the whole of it, to Sarah Atlee's daughter,
Rebecca Throop. The learning upon the
statute against accumulation has, therefore, been rather prodigally wasted.
The question is, who, under Mrs. Atlee's
assignment, is entitled to the principal of
the fund? If Rebecca Throop is, there is,
apparently, no longer any purpose for the
trust to subserve, since it was evidently
framed for the purpose of securing the
principal to some other than Mrs. Throop,
in certain eventualities.
The interest is to be paid to Mrs. Throop
during her life. After her death the principal is to be paid to any surviving child ;
if there is no such child, to Sarah Atlee; if
Sarah Atlee is dead, to her lawful representatives and heirs.
The only child of Mrs. Throop has died,
but no facts make it proper toassume that
other children may not be born and may
not survive her. Hence, the object of the
trust has not been accomplished.
Mrs. Atlee is dead. After the death of
Mrs. Throop, then, the fund is to pass to
any surviving daughter, or, if none, to the
representatives of Mrs. Atlee. Mrs.Throop
is now the representative of Mrs. Atlee,
but it is clear that the representatives intended, were those that would be such, at
the death of Mrs. Throop.
There are two reasons for not permitting
the money to be paid over to Mrs. Throop.
She may have a child to survive her, who
would be entitled to the fund. If she has
not, some one else than Mrs. Throop will
be entitled-viz : the persons who at her
death will be the representatives of Mrs.
Atlee. Cf. Jacobson's Estate, 6 Forum 14.
As the trustee is to keep the fund invested, it should not be paid over to Mrs.
Throop. Were there no trust, it should
not be paid to a life tenant who does not
tender security for its forthcoming at her
death.
Appeal dismissed.

.
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WILLIAMS vs. FARQUAHAR.

.,jectment- Sale of unseated land for
taxes-Act of 11farch 13, 1815-Return qf
tax collector on unseatcd land-Act (f
April 2!, 1856.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

A. B., County Treasurer of Cumberland
County, sold at public sale, and conveyed
by treasurer's deed, seven acres of land in
Mead township, assessed to William H.
Farquahar (seated lands), to George N.
Williams, in fee simple, under an act, entitled "An Act to reduce the State debt
and to incorporate the Pennsylvania R. R.
Co.," passed the 29th day of April, 1844,
for the sumn of SI0.00. The assessor did
not make his return on or before the 1st
day of February, as required by the act of
18.58, entitled "An Act relative to the sale
of lands for the non-payment of taxes,"
but made his return on the 28th day of
February. The defendant, William H.
Farquahar, knowing of this mistake in the
return, has continued in possession of the
land ever since the sale by the county
treasurer, and has permitted his two years
of redemption to run out, without making
any effort to recover the title to the land.
The plaintiff brings this action of ejectment to recover the possession of said
land. Sale was made bytreasurerin June,
1898.
WILLIS for plaintiff.
Cited Act of April 29, 1844, P. &L., Vol.
IT, p. 4615. The statute was directory
only as to time. Gearhart v. Dixon, 1 Pa.
224 ; MeElliney v. Com., 22 Pa. 367; Big
Black Creek Co. v. Com., 94 Pa. 455; Parsons v. Womberg, 130 Md. 561.
Statutes imposing public duties and fixing time of perfornmance are generally directory. Little Beaver Twp. School Directors' Election, 165 Pa. 233.
The sale passes a good title, notwithstanding irregularities antecedent to the
judgment, unless the owner has a good defence, which he has had no day in court
to assert. Scranton v. Miller, 2 Luz. Z. T.
111.
The title is perfect after five years have
elapsed without action being brought.
Parish v. Stevens, 3 S. & R. 296.
WILCOX for defendant.
Cited Act of 1858, P. & L., Vol. II, p.
4622. The action is barred by the statute,
as no claim was entered for more than five
years. Bobbv. Bowen, 9 Pa. 71 ; Sheik v.
McElroy, 20 Pa. 25.
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The limitation commences from the day
of the sale. Bobb v. Bowen, supra.
The limitation will not avail the owner
of a tax title who has not taken possession
nor paid taxes, as against one who is in
actual possession. Hale v. Rittenhouse, 19
Pa. 305.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The question in this case is, whether
the plaintiff obtained a good title by the
tax sale, upon which he could recover in
this action of ejectment. In theopinion of
the court he did not.
The act of 1858, P. & L. vol. 2, p. 4622,
requires that the returns from the collector
of taxes on unseated lands, and from exonerations required to be made in pursuance of the several provisions of the Act of
Assembly, approved April 22,1856, entitled
"An Act relative to the sale of land for
the non-payment of taxes," sfall be good
and valid if made on or before the 1st
day of February, in each and every year,
instead of the first day of January as required by that act.
This act of 1858 does not repeal act of
1856 but simply extends the time one
month. The act of 18.56 provides that returns made after January 1st shall not be
received or be a lien upon real estate and the
same would apply to the act of 1858, as the
statute was mandatory and must be followed as to time, and if by accident or
from other cause this duty had been admitted it may be performed in a reasonable time thereafter, but no such accident
or other cause was shown here, therefore, the return should have been made
promptly on February 1st.
The statute of limitations passed April
3, 1804, P. & L., vol. 2, p. 4638, which provides no action for recovery of said lands
shall lie unless the. same be brought
within five years after the sale of the
land, as aforesaid, does not apply as the
cases make a distinction between an
action by the original owner of the land
and the purchaser at the tax sale. There
is a line of cases in Parish v. Stephen, 3
S. & R. 297; Bobb v. Bowen, 9 Pa. 71;
Johnston v. Jackson, 70 Pa. 165, holding
that the owner of the land cannot bring
action after the five years are elapsed as
provided by act of 1804, but here the
original owner as defendant was in possession of the land and could only be dispossessed by force of a better title if any-

thing was predicated of the sale of 1898, as
divesting that title and reducing the occupants to the position of mere intruders;
we have seen that sale had not that effect.
it being for want of requisites without
effect. The holder of the title to the land,
by the tax sale, may bring an action at
any time, but liemust show that all the
requisites of a valid sale have been complied with. This is the rule laid down in
Bigen v. Karns, 4 W. & S. 137; Hole v.
Rittenhouse, 19 Pa. 305, and 57 Pa. 13, according to the acts and decision laid down
judgment must be for defendant, as sale
was made on an illegal return.
Praintiff non-suited.
LOURIMER, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The authority to sell unseated land for
taxes assessed upon it is conferred by the
Act of March 13th, 1815. 2 P. & L. 4625.
Such sales are to be made for taxes that
shall have "remained due and unpaid for
the space of one year before." The mode
of making them is prescribed with some
particularity.
The 2d section of the Act of April 21,
1856, 2 P. & L. 4622, requires tax collectors
to make their returns of collections of
taxes on unseated land on or before the 1st
of January in each year, and declares that
"if not so made * * * such returns
shall not thereafter be received, nor shall
such taxes be a lien on real estate." Assessors and collectors, and their bail, are,
however, liable for not making the returns
within the tine. The 3d section of the
same act requires collectors, claiming exonerations, to return such exonerations on
or before the 1st of January in each year.
The commissioners are forbidden to grant
any exonerations after that time, and the
county treasurer is directed not "to sell
any lands which shall have been returned
and taxes exonerated, after thesaid time."
The Act of February 23d, 1858, 2 P. & ,.
4622, enacts that the "returns for the collection of taxes on unseated lands and for
exonerations" "shall be good and valid, if
made on or before" the 1st of February, in
each year, instead of the 1st of January.
It is the intention of these acts to condition the power of the county treasurer to
sell unseated land, upon the return of the
taxes for collection, on or before the 1st
day of February. If they are not then re-

THE FORUM
turned, no subsequent exoneration of the
collector is permissible, and the tax not
being a lien on the land, the collector, or
his bail, is personally liable. The requirement concerning the time of the return is
mandatory. Vandermark v. Phillips, 116
Pa. 199.
The 2d section of the Act of 1856, expressly refers to unseated land only. The3d
section concerns any taxes whatever, and
forbids the sale of "any lands" which shall
have been returned, and taxes exonerated.
It was understood in Vandermark v. Phillips, 116 Pa. 199, that "any lands" embraced "seated" lards.
It is the duty of the tax collector to collect taxes levied on seated land by distress,
if possible. If he can find no goods anywhere, he may seek and obtain an eNoneration. but he must do this on or before
February 1st of the year following that in
which the tax is assessed. If he returns
the tax after that date, and obtains an exoneratiob, it is "not" lawful * * * for
the county treasurer to sell any lands. If
he returns the tax after that date, but
does not apply for or obtain an exoneration, the treasurer must a fortiori be
equally powerless to sell the land. It
would be absurd to hold the land discharged when the collector is also discharged, and to refuse to hold it discharged
while he is liable.
As the treasurer was prohibited by the
3d section of the Act of 1856 from selling
the land, the attempted sale was void, and
Farquahar was neither bound to, nor able
to, redeem. His title had not been even
provisionally divested.
The fiveyears' limitation of the 3d section of the Act of A.pril 3d, 1804, is a limitation upon the former owner and not
upon the purchaser at the tax sale. The
purchaser can bring suit at any time, unless a twenty-one years' adverse possession
of the former owner has intervened. McReynolds v. Longenberger, 57 Pa. 13;
Bigler v. Karns, 4 W. & S. 137; Rupert v.
Velps, 7 Super 209; Cuttle v. Brockway,
24 Pa. 147; Alexander v. Bush, 46 Pa. 62;
Lackawanna Iron Co. v. Fales, 55 Pa. 90.
Judgment affirmed.
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WM. TILLER vs. SARAH TILLER.
Confession of judgment-Effect of failure
to record assignment of judgmentRiqhtsq
of attachment-executioncreditors.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

A was the owner of a house and lot and
contracts debts for groceries to B. Shortly
afterwards she confesses a judgment to C,
her son. H loans money to C and takes
an assignment of the judgment of C
against A as collateral security but does
not enter the assignment at the time. E,
a judgment creditor of C, issues an attachment of execution against C and attaches this judgment. This judgment of
E is for a pre-existing debt. F loans
money to C without any actual notice of
the assignment and attachment of the
judgment against A except what might
be presumed from the record of the attachment and takes an assignment of the judgment and enters his assignment. Then
H enters his assignment on record.
F issues an execution and on this the
house and lot of A is sold and the money
is in court for distribution. B alleges that
the judgment given by A is fraudulent.
Question: In either case, who will be
entitled to the proceeds of the sale?
HELLER for Ballentine.
Creditors are entitled to be paid as their
claims accrue, and a debtor has no more
right to postpone payment for his own advantage than to defeat it altogether, and a
purpose to hinder and delay a creditor is
fradulent, although debtor may honestly
intend to ultimately make payment of all
his debts. Am. & Eng. Eue. Law, vol.
14, p. 244.
A person taking a confession of judgment from a failing debtor, must, when
called upon by creditors, satisfactorily
show the consideration on which it is
founded, and by a failure to do so, it may
be inferred that the judgment was without consideration and fraudulent. Ditchburn v. Jermyn & Glenwood Co. Operative Association, 13 Pa. C. C. R.-p. 1.
REESER for Fearne.
The statute 13 Eliz. c. 5 does not operate
to defeat any estate or interest conveyed
upon good consideration and bona fide to
any person not having at- time of such
conveyance notice of fraud. Tiffany on
Sales, p. 125.
A purchaser parting with value upon
faith of vendor's possession and ownership
of property, acquires not only the legal
but an equitable title superior to that of a
creditor. Gudley v. Wynant, 23 How. U.
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S. 501; Jones v. Simpson, 116 U. S. 609;
Scott v. Hilager, 14 Pa. 238.
Property iii hands of an assignee, under
a valid assignment, cannot be attached.
Colby v. Coats, 6 Cash. (Mass) 553; Am. &
Eng. Enc. Law, vol. 3, p. 212.
The right of creditors of a fraudulent
vendor to avoid a sale cannot be exercised
against one, who, without notice of the
fraudhas in good faith purchased the property from the fraudulent vendee. Bean v.
Smith, 2 Mason (U. S.) 252; Fletcher v.
Peck, 6 Cranch (U. S.) 133; Simms v.
M1orse, 4 Hughs (U. S.) 579; Freiburg v.
Dreyfus, 135 (U. 8.) 478.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The court here is asked to determine the
respective rights of the parties in this case
to the distribution of the proceeds of the
sale of property under an execution by
the sheriff, which sum has been paid into
court by him.
B claims priority, alleging that the confession ofjudgment by A to C was made
with the intent and purpose to hinder,
delay, and defraud A's creditors, and is
as against him void and of no effect. B
is a simple contract creditor. Prior to the
act of 1897, a simple contract creditor had
no standing or rights in law to demand an
issue to try the bona fides of a judgment
confessed by his debtor. Young v. Sailer,
11 W. N. C. 282; Ludlow v. Dutton, 1
Phila. R. 226. Nor had he any rights in
equity, it being said, "A rule of procedure
which allowed any prowling creditor, before his claim was definitely established
by judgment, and without reference to the
character of his demand, to file a bill
* * *.*
to impeach transfers or to interfere with the business affairs of the
alleged debtor, would manifestly be susceptible of the grossest abuse." Artman v.
Giles App., 155 Pa. 417. This disability
was removed by the act of July 9, 1897,
above referred to, which gives the creditor of the person or party against whom
such judgment has been confessed, the
right to apply by petition and contest the
validity of any judgment so confessed,
provided the creditor applying for such
rule has reason to believe such judgment
is invalid and fraudulent, &c. Has B established fraud? Fraud is not presumedit is a matter to be proved, and must be
proved by the party who alleges it. There
is no evidence before the court of the insolvency of A or that she wasin failing circu mstances at the time this judgment was

given, and it is admitted also that thejudgment was in payment of an actual existing
debt due by A. The law is clearly defined
and laid down that to impeach the paymerit or security of an actual debt there
should be evidence tending to show either:
first, some other benefit or advantage to
the debtor beyond the discharge of his
obligation; or, secondly, some other benefit to the creditor beyond mere payment
of his debt. The rights of debtors and
creditors in this regard are very fully reviewed in the case of Warner v. Zierfuss,
162 Pa. 360, and it is unnecessary to dwell
on them at this time,-suffice to say that
after a careful consideration and application of the principles therein contained to
the evidence adduced, we are irresistibly
drawn to the conclusion that B's contention cannot be supported. He stands in the
position of a simple contract creditor, and
possesses the rights of a simple contract
creditor only.
As appears from the facts, C assigned
his judgment v. A to H1. It is not disputed but that this assignment was regular and was made for a valid and sufficient
consideration, but E, the attachmentexecution creditor of C, contends that he
should have priority over H in the distribution of the proceeds of this sale becausehehad neither actual norconstructive
notice of the assignment of this judgment
by C to H; that H, as against him, was
bound to record his assignment and have
the same appear of record, and that by his
failure to do so he is postponed in his
rights to E. It is an early and well
recognized principle that the object of
spreading an instrument on a public record
is to give constructive notice of its contents to all mankind, and the legislature,
by means of recording acts from time to
time has provided means for the accomplishment of this purpose. But these acts
were passed for the protection of bona fide
purchasers and subsequent assignees for
value,-to protect them from the perpetration of fraud and imposition by those
having the evidences of ownership, and
although such recording is discretionary
under the acts, yet, if by reason of the
failure, as in this case, of an assignee to
record his assignment, the assignor is
enabled to perpetrate a fraud on a subsequent innocent purchaser for value, who,
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by the exercise of proper diligence, could
not otherwise know of the prior assignment, it is clear that the prior assignee
would be postponed, on the well established principle, that unless there has been
supineness on the other side, negligence
in the enjoyment of property, or the
exercise of a right, is cause of redress in
equity and at law. This principle is
drawn in part from the legal maxim that
a man is bound to enjoy his property so
as to do no injury to another which can
be prevented, and in recognition of the
justice of the same, it has been held in
several cases that the assignee of a judgment, * * * who fails to have his assignment noted on the record, will be
postponed to a subsequent assignee of the
judgment for value, and without notice.
Fisher v. Knox, 1. H. 622; Sharp v.
Hutchison, I Kulp 409, and cases therein
cited.
Is then, E a bona fide purchaser
for value within the meaning of the recording acts? E's debt has already been
incurred, the consideration has been paid,
he has surrendered no security, he is not
parting with anything on the strength of
his execution and is receiving nothing,-he
has done no act which will leave him in a
worse position than before. See 24 Am. &
Eng. Enc. Law, p. 138, and cases
cited. Not being a purchaser for value
and within the protection of the recording acts, E is regarded as acquiring such
rights only as his debtor had,-he claims
under but not through him. He can acquire no greater right than was vested in
the latter at the time the writ was served
upon the garnishee. By the assignment,
the equitable title and right to the money
represented by the judgment vests in the
assignee,-all that can be seized in execution is the right which remains in the
assignor, and this is nothing more than
the mere naked legal title subject to the
equitable interest of the assignee. This
principle is laid down in the case of
Jarecki M'f'g Co. v. Hart Bros, 5 Pa. Sup.
Ct. 424, and it extends to the rights of all
persons interested in the fund at the time
the attaching creditor seeks to appropriate
it, whether as joint owners, co-partners, or
assignees of the debtor, and the attaching
creditors right is subordinate to all bona
fide claims existing before the writ is
served, as above stated. See also Pelman
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v. Hart, 1 Pa. 263; Noble v. Thompson Oil
Co., 79 Pa. 354.
As to the right of priority of E over F.
By the attachment-execution, E became
entitled to whatever funds due to C after
the satisfaction of H's claim. E's rights
became fixed and vested by the service of
the process, and C could not by his own
acts afterwards affect or partially divest
them. C could not by assignment to F
confer better rights on his assignee than
he himself possessed.
It is therefore decreed, that the fund in
hand shall be applied to the satisfaction
of the claims, 1st, of H.; 2nd, of E; 3rd, of
HEDGES, J.
F, and 4th, to B.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
Ballentine is a creditor of Tiller, without
judgment. That, prior to the At of July
9th, 1897, (3 P. & L, 359), he could not have
intervened to set aside the judgment of
Sarah Tiller, or to arrest its execution, and
the distribution of the money produced by
the execution sale, sufficiently appears in
Artman v. Giles, 155 Pa. 417. That act
provides for the arrest of an execution on
a judgment where bad faith, with respect
to creditors of the defendant therein, is
alleged, and for a distribution of the proceeds of sale among honest judgments to
the exclusion of dishonest ones. Though
several courts have denounced this act as
unconstitutional, its agreement with the
Constitution of Pennsylvania must be accepted, since Page v. Suspender Co., 191
Pa. 511.
Ballentine, however, has not proceeded
under this act. He has not attempted to
inquire into the bonafides of the judgment
prior to the issue of a fi fa, nor pending a
fifa. The sheriff's sale has taken place,
and he, for the first time, intervenes, in
order to demand a share in the fund produced by the sale. The object of the act
of 1897 is to prevent a judicial sale on an
impeachable judgment, not to enable a
creditor without lien or judgment, to take
a portion of the proceeds. It was error
therefore for the learned court below to
allot to Ballentine any portion of the fund.
The fund was produced by the fi fa
issued on the judgment. The ownership
of this judgment is claimed by three persons; by John Hope, in virtue of an assignment to him byWm. Tiller; by Jacob
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Emory, who has attached it for a debt
owed by Win. Tiller, and by Isaiah
Fearne, to whom Win. Tiller has made a
second assignment of the judgment.
Hope, the first assignee, took the judgment as security for a loan synchronously
made.
He was, therefore, a bona fide
purcha:ser of it. He ought to have caused
the assignment to be docketed with the
judgment in order to apprize others who
might contemplate buying it from, or lending upon it to, the same assignor, Tiller,
that it was no longer in Tiller's dispositive power.
In ignorance of the assignment to Hope,
Emory attached it in execution. If this
gave him the status of a purchaser for
value, the prior assignment would be, as
to him, void. We follow Judge Endlich,
in Bechtel v. Lauer Brewing Co., 21 Pa.
C. C. 449, in holding that he did not gain
this status, and that the prior assignment
remained valid as to him.
Fearne subsequently lends money to
Tiller and the judgment is simultaneously
assigned by the latter to him. He is a
purchaser for value; and, as such, would
have a better right to the judgment than
Hope, did the contract concern them
alone. Fisher v. Knox, 13 Pa. 622; Campbell's Appeal, 29 Pa 401; Fraley's Appeal,
76 Pa.42; 10 P. & L. Dig. Decisions, 165.2.
But, had there been no assignment to
Hope, would Fearne be entitled to the
money in preference to Emory? It is not

necessar, that the attaching creditor
should take any particular measures to
inform others that he has attached. When
a fi fa reaches the sheriff's hands, the
whole world is affected by it. A bonafide
purchaser, subsequently, of a chattel from
the defendant, could buy subject to the
lien of thefifa. A purchaser of A's claim
against B, would take it subject to a prior
execution attachment of it by a creditor
of A, whether he knew of the attachment
or not. Were the law otherwise, the attaching creditor could always be thwarted
by the defendant's finding some bona fide
purchaser for value.
The facts of the case, therefore, exhibit
these relations of the parties. The assignment to Hope is good, as respects the
Emory attachment; and the Emory attachment is good, as respects the Fearne
assignment, but the Hope assignment
would be bad, as respects the Fearne assignment. The result must be, that the
Hope assignment will prevail. In competition among liens, when A's is better
than B's, and B's better than C's, A's is
entitled to be first paid, though A's is inferior to C's. 1 Liens, 297. The same
principle is the key to the problem before us.
The decree of the learned court below
must be so far modified as to give any
residue, after satisfying Hope, Emory and
Fearne, in the order of their names, to the
defendant in thejudgment.
Modified judgment affirmed.

